Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. The Army has launched itself on a daring trajectory toward the Objective Force. It will transform the Army forces into a more lethal and devastating force through the combination of precision weapons and knowledge-based warfare. Army forces will survive through information dominance, provided by a torrent of ones and zeros sent from remote sensors and processed by on board computers. As the Army builds the Objective Force it will attempt to link systems from "mud to space" in order to create a synergistic effect between the warrior and the information sphere. Information will empower the Army's Objective Forces. Space-based systems will be foundational building blocks for the Objective Force to achieve information dominance and satellite communications will enable knowledge based battle command on the move. Thus, the ability to link space-based capabilities to warfighting units in a timely and relevant manner is critical to Objective Force success. Army transformation plans for space to lift a heavy load for the Objective Force by using space capabilities to provide intelligence, navigation, warning and more. Nowhere is the Objective Force success more dependent, than on its ability to network together enabling information for dominant situational knowledge. This 
LIST OF TABLES

IS THERE SPACE FOR THE OBJECTIVE FORCE?
The ultimate goal of Army Transformation -the Objective Force -will consist of lighter but highly lethal, mobile, and survivable formations that arrive in an area of operations ready to fight and fully synchronized with other elements of the joint Force. Our successful transformation to the Objective Force will depend to a great extent on our ability to develop and operationalize new and improved space-based capabilities. As a space-empowered force, the Objective Force will routinely exploit the overhead constellation of national, commercial and military space platforms for intelligence, focused surveillance, and area reconnaissance; long-haul communications; early warning of missile attack; positioning, timing, and navigation; missile defense; and access to the Global Information Grid… What exactly the Objective Force will look like is not yet certain. We know it will be a space-empowered military force able to deliver precisely calibrated effects, from taking a picture to dropping a precision munition, at any time and anywhere on Earth. The Objective Force is to be more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations than the Legacy Force. It will provide the Nation an array of more deployable, more agile, more versatile, more lethal, more survivable, and more sustainable formations that are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. These capabilities will enable the Objective Force to win on the offense, to initiate combat on their terms, to gain and retain the initiative, build momentum quickly and win decisively.
 General Eric K. Shinseki
The Army has launched itself on a daring trajectory toward the Objective Force. That force represents an innovative model of warfare, embracing new information technologies while leaving industrial age tools behind. It will transform the Army forces into a more lethal and devastating force through the combination of precision weapons and knowledge-based warfare.
Objective Forces will survive through information dominance, provided by a torrent of ones and zeros sent from remote sensors and processed by on board computers. Precision strike and information dominance represent a quantum leap from brute force legacy systems such as the M1A1 Abrams tank. The realties of warfare in the twenty-first century will relegate the Army's heavy forces to a more limited set of missions. As the Army builds the Objective Force it will attempt to link systems from "mud to space" in order to create a synergistic effect between the warrior and the information sphere. Information will empower the Army's Objective Forces.
Space-based systems will represent the foundational building blocks for the Objective Force to achieve information dominance. Satellite communications will enable knowledge-based battle command on the move. Thus, the ability to link space-based capabilities to warfighting units in a timely and relevant manner is critical for Objective Force success.
WHY THE OBJECTIVE FORCE NEEDS SPACE
WHY AN OBJECTIVE FORCE?
The pace towards the Objective Force has stirred up much controversy. For many, the need for an Objective Force is not apparent. Their vision of future threats suggests that the status quo with incremental improvements in legacy weapon systems is sufficient. They point to successes enjoyed by United States forces over the past decade and for the need of heavy armored forces to counter threats by potential adversaries. Those advocating a rapid advance towards the Objective Force have a different view of history and the future. Led by the Army's Chief of Staff, they see land power as a critical tool for the nation's defense, one now marginalized because of its inability to address many of the nation's needs. Both groups envision the need to master a powerful opponent, but those advocating the Objective Force seek new and more flexible approaches.
To achieve the flexibility required for a more agile and effective force, the Army's mass must dramatically change. One can review the legacy force as a sumo wrestler with tremendous strength, but requiring a commensurate amount of support and sustenance. During the 1991 Gulf War, after taking five months to deploy, United States armored divisions crushed Iraqi forces in their path. The Army's new vision is more like that of a samurai warrior capable of rapid, decisive movements. While this samurai may be less than half the size of the legacy force and looks puny in comparison, enhanced knowledge and agility will allow him to appear unexpectedly and to apply the right force to destroy his enemies.
Army transformation plans for space to lift a heavy load for the Objective Force by using its capabilities to provide intelligence, navigation, warning, and more. Nowhere is Objective Force success more dependent than on its ability to network together enabling information for dominant situational knowledge. This paper will address Army satellite communications needs to determine if current and future space communications can provide the capabilities the The need for space capabilities permeates the Objective Force from the actions required at home before deployment, through rapid redeployment after a conflict. Following the space cords that weave through the design of the Objective Force highlights the contributions expected and required from space-based capabilities. At the most basic level, the Objective Force requires three things from space to realize its operational capabilities;
• weight reduction, resulting in increases in responsiveness and agility
• information dominance to see first, understand first, and act first Space systems increase the lethality of the Objective Force and reduce the number of weapons and munitions required in a number of ways. Precise knowledge of friendly and enemy forces, combined with precision weapon systems, represents a devastating combination.
Historically, Army forces have lacked the ability for precision engagement beyond line of sight.
To compensate for the lack of precision, the Army has often substituted mass. For example, during the Korean War one artillery battalion fired 14,425 rounds in a twenty-four hour period of time. Units found themselves positioning the guns based on where the rail lines were instead of where they could be most effective in order to allow offloading directly from railcars to gun positions.
4 Space-based knowledge of targets combined with weapons guided by space-based navigation provide a quantum reduction in Objective Force mass, while increasing speed.
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Further weight reductions for the Objective Force will occur through the use of spacebased information to dissipate the fog of war. Carl von Clausewitz coined the term "fog of war" in his work "On War" to describe the uncertainties and ambiguities that characterize the conduct of war at every level. Even with radical improvements in satellite imagery, the use of night-vision goggles and the Predator, technology cuts through only some of the fog. Gigabytes and streaming video are no guarantee that people will learn everything they want to know or even see the same thing. The most skilled operators could achieve a speed of forty-two words per minute, which would equate to the modern scale of thirty-two bits per second. By the end of the Civil War, Grant was using the telegraph to control nearly a half a million soldiers.
World War I saw relatively small changes in the speed of communications. By World War II the telephone and radio had dramatically improved voice communication, but the speed of data transmission had only doubled from in the Civil War. The advent of computer technology, however, changed everything as is shown by the logarithmic rate of increase in Figure 2 . By the Gulf War, single data circuits were transmitting data as fast as 256 Thousand Bits (Kbs) per second, an increase of more than 3,600 times in only forty years. The increase in data flow provides key information to legacy forces, but only begins to hint at the demands an Objective Force will place on communications systems.
Not only has the amount of data exploded, but the number of sites that need data has multiplied as well. During the Civil War only commanders of armies and corps required longrange communications to conduct military operations. In contrast, the Objective Force requires that individual combat platforms and soldiers have a high level of access to digital data immediately upon entry into the battle space. These formations will fight in a more dispersed fashion than ever before. The highly mobile platforms of the Objective Force will require digital terrain products to provide soldiers the knowledge of how to mask and transit the terrain without exposure to hostile fires. While providing critical protection, the same attributes that make this force faster, more survivable, and lethal, also make it more difficult to communicate with other Army entities in the force. Future forces will transmit and receive information through a worldwide supporting communications infrastructure known as the Global Information Grid. If disconnected from the Global Information Grid (GIG), Objective Force elements lose connectivity with long-range sensors as well as the enabling information and knowledge pushed from reach-back centers located far from the conflict. Disconnected units will lose their ability to see enemy forces and identify friendly forces. The result will be a force more vulnerable to attack as well as an increased vulnerability for friendly-fire incidents. In many cases, these forces must access space-based communications, when unable to connect with terrestrial line of sight communications systems.
OBJECTIVE FORCE CONCEPT
The Objective Force units designed to close with and engage enemy forces are Units of Action (UofA). …FCS Communications, the enabler for FCS at large, is likely to be critically dependent on the use of airborne (and space-borne) assets due to limited LOS connectivity in complex terrain and foliage…. Terrestrial communications alone will not be adequate to support FCS; airborne and SATCOM networks will have to become critical parts of the FCS system, rather than 'opportunistic luxuries'.
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The Objective Force will depend on space-based communications from before it deploys until it returns to home station. SATCOM connectivity to our highly specialized forces is more critical than ever before." 
EHF Communications
EHF communications were originally developed to transmit Emergency Action Messages (EAM) and voice instructions for command and control of nuclear weapons. These preformatted messages did not require a high data rate, so that a maximum data rate of 2.4kbs was selected.
22 This small trickle of data is mixed with a flood of up to 40Mbs of data generated from a secure cipher, which is so complex that the pattern will not repeat itself for hundreds of years. The resulting transmission is a complex waveform resistant to jamming and interruption.
While this is highly desirable for nuclear command and control, it represents a very inefficient use of the spectrum to transmit large amounts of data. While the two original satellites only supported low data rate transmissions (75bps -2,400bps), the final four were constructed with a medium-data rate package that supports T1 size channels (1.54Mbps). Concept. Existing frequencies used at division and below provide the capacity for limited data exchange and verbal command and control, while providing good penetration of many of the environmental conditions commonly found on the battlefield like rain smoke and foliage. These frequencies also operate with relatively small antennas and radios, which are important for mobile ground forces. Congressional testimony that "New platforms are producing an increasing flow of data, but our ability to exploit this data has not kept pace." He then went on to site "insufficient communications" as one of the key shortfalls. 36 These "bit rate" shortfalls to the ground combat soldier have a direct correlation with the ability to maintain sufficient information dominance to keep our forces alive. For example, some friendly force losses in Afghanistan may have been avoided, if the capability existed to fuse, process and transmit information already in hand to the point on the battlefield where the knowledge would make a difference.
TODAY'S SATCOM CANNOT MEET THE VISION FOR TOMORROW
COMMUNICATIONS SHORTFALLS
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For the Objective Force to maintain information dominance, data and more importantly knowledge throughput to the deploying force must increase. Information must be processed, synthesized, and forwarded in real time. Smart sensors must know where to probe and intelligent systems must be able to extract critical information and forward the data in a compressed format. The solution to these problems will require a combination of increased capability, smarter processing, and appetite suppression. Today, systems collect much more information than they process, and they process more than they make available to the tactical commander. Deploying Objective Force units will not only need to reach forward to maintain situational awareness of the operational environment, but will also require simultaneous reachback to supporting analysis structures at its deployment base. An increase in wideband capability is necessary for truly seamless information flow during the transition from home station through deployment. 
DEALING WITH REALITY
MUD TO SPACE -COMPLEX SOLUTIONS FOR COMPLEX PROBLEMS
Solving the Objective Force information needs at the warfighter level requires visionary solutions, unaffected by the cultures and biases of today's organizations and programmatics.
Solutions to this challenge are expensive, require changes that cut across traditional areas of responsibility, and require technologies that continue to change at a breathtaking pace. But this should not come as a surprise. Acquisition strategies must plan for technology insertion, upgrades, and programmed replacements, while executing best value purchasing policies.
There is no single solution or program office that can meet the Army's needs. Some of the solutions will come from the joint environment, while others must come from other agencies.
For solutions to work, they must comprehensively address changes throughout the network of architectures that create the system. These changes should start at the birth of data where it is first collected and continue to the purging or archiving of the data, when the warfighters needs are satisfied. In addition to addressing changes to the data itself, the systems of hardware, software, formats, linkages and human interfaces of the architectures must be addressed as well.
Data Level Solutions -Reducing Demand And Enabling Data Interchange
At the point of data creation the Objective Force needs a strong set of standards and formats in order to enable rapid data interchange between network components. An unattended ground sensor should be able to pass its data directly to weapons platforms from any service without concerns about programming language, data elements, or measurement standards.
Strong enforcement of standards across the Department of Defense will simplify network development and data interchange. The National Space Security Architect established a longrange plan as an outgrowth of its Mission Information Management (MIM) Information Management Architecture (IMA) study 40 to bring data generating systems into a standard architecture that would result not only in synergistic effects, but long-term cost savings as well.
The major problem with this plan is that it lacks a powerful governing board to arbitrate changes to the standards or an enforcement mechanism, to keep programs in compliance.
Once collected, data must be transmitted. 
Internet Protocol and Packet Data
Currently, most military communications use dedicated communications pipes, which will become unsupportable in the future due to their inefficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Objective Force Communications must transition most of these systems 44 to a smart Internet Protocol (IP) based network to allow data to be sent as packets similar to Internet traffic. This packet approach enables each communications pipeline to service many users and allows the throughput of the channel to be maximized. Large packetized data files are sent over multiple streams for reassembly at destination. Encrypted packets must provide multilevel security and smart dithering of data. Automatic dithering reduces the amount of data passed to minimum essential elements when the network capability is restricted. This allows for the graceful degradation of the system when communications nodes are operating at reduced capability or blocked. Multi-band radios like the Joint Tactical Radio System will provide seamless switching
between jammed and open channels. Smart dithering and prioritization of the data streams ensure that the most critical data can always get through. This thinning of the data becomes critical when units are on the move or during periods of bad weather. A future combat system traveling down a road in Bosnia could link to an EHF satellite to enable large data transfers. As it starts to rain, EHF communications dramatically drop off and as the vehicle passes into a wooded section of the road the EHF signal is lost. As the primary signal fades the onboard communications would automatically select a different satellite or use the strongest of the remaining signals and continue the download of critical packets. In this case UHF communications with their rain penetrating characteristics continue to transmit critical information at a much reduced data rate. The systems above would prioritize data including threats and warnings to friendly forces first.
Frequency Reuse
The electromagnetic spectrum is key terrain for the Objective Force. Maximizing the use of available bandwidth in the spectrum can provide a marked advantage to the Future Combat System when sufficient information is passed to meet the combat needs. Unfortunately, the requirements on this fixed number of radio frequencies continue to rise while the available frequencies are fixed by the laws of physics. Given that no additional spectrum can be created, the need for communications must be filled by using available frequencies more efficiently and more creatively. and their need for hardware separate from that fielded to military forces. 45 In addition to these problems, there is no assurance that commercial providers will have capacity available to sell.
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Taking several proactive steps will mitigate these difficulties and enable commercial communications to provide part of the answer.
Instead of relying on the communications spot market the Defense Information Systems
Agency should purchase large blocks of frequency in areas where military operations are likely.
Long-term contracts can be negotiated at much lower rates and will ensure communications are available when needed. These commercial satellites can provide much of the communications needed for large headquarters and fixed sites, which are not served by fiber connections leaving the military satellites for mobile users. 47 Agreements with commercial providers for back up satellite command and control and satellite hardening requirements would provide greater assurance of availability in times of conflict. Working closely with commercial providers may enable the military to add dedicated transponders to commercial satellites, which have available power and space onboard the satellite bus. These additional assets could provide redundancy and robustness to the overall constellation with relatively small costs. The addition of crosslinking capabilities to new commercial satellites would enable these commercial satellites to integrate into the global network to provide more direct support. More importantly new military terminals must be built with the ability to receive and transmit on commercial frequencies so new radios are not required when we are able to augment our capabilities with commercial spectrum.
SATELLITE SOLUTIONS AND SURROGATES
Satellite Design
At the space end of the communications problem satellites and satellite constellations must be designed to support the operational needs. Satellites need onboard processors to support network management and routing of packetized data. These satellites would become a space based network computer server to push the right packets to the right users on the right frequencies to maximize throughput and ensure delivery. Satellite themselves must be crosslinked to form a self-managing network that reroutes traffic to avoid congestion and blockages of the communications signal. A space based communications backbone could create a nearly limitless data pipeline using laser communications to increase bandwidth within the network.
Laser links could transmit data packets between satellites for transmission to the ground using traditional frequencies and link high altitude aircraft and airships with laser signals. Satellites must be built with a maximize the number of narrow spot beams. Spot beams increase the signal power to the user, reduce jamming threats and allow multiple users who are geographically separated to use the same frequency without interference virtually multiplying the usable bandwidth by the number of spot beams. Flying multi-band satellites would enable ground, sea, and air-based equipment with stabilized antenna systems to seamlessly switch on the move from one band to the next without having to search for and reacquire a lock on another satellite. Multi-band satellites can be single large satellites or merely appear as a single satellite by flying clusters of micro satellites in a precision orbit. Giant antennas in space, larger than a football field, would enable smaller low power hand held and wearable devices to communicate via space. These complex antenna structures could be assembled and mated in space at the International Space Station, thus reducing the costs and risks involved with deploying the intricate engineering structures robotically. Future satellites should be designed for on orbit repair and upgrade. Micro satellites could repair and refuel these large investments in national infrastructure, similar to the way the Hubble Telescope has been repaired and upgraded using astronauts from the space shuttle. Geosynchronous satellites provide limited coverage for mobile users at high latitudes, in urban canyons and in complex terrain due to the need of the vehicles antenna to be able to see the satellite. One way to overcome this "look angle" problem is to augment the geosynchronous network with a robust low or medium earth orbit constellation that can provide the high look angles needed to ensure data delivery.
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Because these satellites are closer to the earth they can transmit more powerful signals to ground receivers and receive weaker low power signals in return. In addition to power benefits these closer satellites can reuse the frequency spectrum as was described in the spot beam characteristics above. To track these satellites moving at 17,000 miles per hour, vehicle antenna systems must be extremely agile and ideally would consist of phased arrays that are electronically steered to compensate for vehicle movement. Space systems can be augmented by high altitude systems which appear as satellites from the ground force prospective. have the capability to multiply bandwidth available to the warfighter through frequency reuse as part of a robust system of systems to meet Objective Force needs.
CONCLUSION
The capacity to produce relevant knowledge will meter the tempo of theater operations. I believe the difficulty of gathering the information needed for high tempo, largely scale, multidimensional and noncontiguous operations is largely underestimated…If Army units are to fight off the ramp, they must have situational understanding off the ramp. I suspect that there is an important delta between the capability projected to be available by 2015 and that which will be required… If our concepts depend on purpose oriented networks and knowledge enabled organizations, we must invest in the communications that will enable them.
49
The Objective Force Concept is a visionary change in future ground combat operations.
When the vision comes to fruition, it will provide a critical capability to the United States as it seeks to ensure peace and security in a changing world. Pivotal to the forces' effectiveness are the space enablers to tie together fast moving agile forces, dispersed across the battlefield. Of the space enablers, satellite communications play an essential role in information dominance and success. However, existing satellite communications systems designed and built for Cold systems cannot support the mobility, agility, and speed expected of these forces. The growth of communications requirements needed to support Future Combat Systems and the Objective Force requires complex multi-echelon solutions, with fundamental changes from the smallest data bit to the largest satellite 22,300 miles in space. Solutions will not be easy or cheap, but require a strong hand to ensure the multiple acquisition systems, doctrine, and requirements processes synchronize in support of a clear objective.
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5 COL Bill Pierce my advisor on this project notes that precision strikes may not have the same psychological effect on the enemy than that caused by the more random devastation caused by tons of unguided bombs tumbling from a B-52. While relatively little has been written at the Army War College on this topic a search of the student papers at the Air War College provides numerous papers supporting both sides of this argument. The larger preponderance of these papers argue that precision strike has a psychological deterrent of its own. 8 Eric K. Shinseki and Thomas E. White, "Transformation Roadmap,"., 14.
9 Bandwidth is a measurement of how much information can be carried over a communications link. In satellite communications, bandwidth is the width of the range of frequencies that an electronic signal occupies. Bandwidth is expressed as data speed in bits per second (bps).. A typical telephone call uses a bandwidth of approximately three to four kilohertz (3-4 kHz); while a television broadcast signal has a bandwidth two thousand times greater of six megahertz (6 MHz). 11 Units of Action are brigade sized forces capable of combined arms operation within a 75 km radius of operations executing Full Spectrum capabilities. The Army's UA will be part of a joint team that is decisive in any operation, against any level threat, in any environment. This team must be strategically and operationally responsive, rapidly deployable, able to change patterns of operations faster than the enemy can respond, and adjust to enemy changes of operations faster than he can exploit them. The hallmarks of UA operations will be the significant ability to develop situations out of contact, come at the enemy in unexpected ways, use teaming with leader initiative, maneuver to positions of advantage with speed and agility, engage enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons, destroying them with enhanced fires, and assaulting at times and places of our choosing. Although not necessarily sequential, it is the combination of fires (precision and volume) and maneuver, and the tactical assault that makes the enemy's problem so difficult. The cumulative effect of simultaneous, multi-dimensional operations will be to dominate an adversary, enabling friendly forces to destroy, dislocate and disintegrate him, and transition to the next engagement. TRADOC Pamphlet 325-3-90 Unit of Action O & O Plan.
